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Abstract: Intellectual humility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes (as 
these aƌe uŶdeƌstood iŶ soĐial psǇĐhologǇͿ diƌeĐted toǁaƌd oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ŵake-up and 
its components, together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their 
contents or bases, which serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to 
defend this new account of humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectual self-
acceptance of epistemic limitations and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes. 
The position defended here addresses the shortcomings of both ignorance and accuracy 
based accounts of humility. 
 
Intellectual humility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes (as these are 
uŶdeƌstood iŶ soĐial psǇĐhologǇͿ diƌeĐted toǁaƌd oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe make-up and its components, 
together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their contents or bases, which 
serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to defend this new account of 
humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectual self-acceptance of epistemic limitations 
and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes.1 I argue that these traits are conceptually 
distinct, but psychologically unified. Humility is the complex virtue comprising modesty and 
self-acceptance. 
Broadly speaking, there are two families of views in the contemporary philosophical 
literature on humility.2 The first family portrays it, following Driver (1989, 1999, 2001), as a 
                                                     
1 This paper is exclusively concerned with the intellectual version of this virtue. Occasionally, however, purely for 
stylistic ƌeasoŶs aŶd to aǀoid ƌepetitioŶ I dƌop the ƋualifiĐatioŶ ͚iŶtelleĐtual͛ iŶ the teǆt. I shall Ŷot addƌess heƌe the 
undoubtedly interesting question of the relation between humility as a putative moral virtue and intellectual 
humility. 
2 Many of these views concern humility as a putative moral virtue. However, it does not seem implausible to think 
that, mutatis mutandae, the same accounts could be developed specifically for intellectual humility. 
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virtue of ignorance.3 The second describes humility, following Snow (1995) as a virtue of 
accuracy. In my opinion both approaches hint at something which is true of humility in so far as 
they point in the direction of one of its two dimensions. However, neither approach gets the 
dimension toward which they are gesturing exactly right. In addition, they both miss one of the 
two dimensions altogether.4 
The most serious problem with these accounts, however, if the view developed here is 
correct, is that they all characterise humility either in terms of the presence (or absence) of 
some cold cognitive state, such as belief, or as depending on the absence of some hot 
motivational state, like ĐaƌiŶg foƌ oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ good featuƌes.5 These authors often grant 
that all virtues have motivational components, such as a love of epistemic goods, but presume 
that what distinguishes humility from other virtues is not a motivational state. Instead, I argue 
that the dispositions and emotions which are characteristic of intellectual humility are best 
explained as based on attitudes directed toward compoŶeŶts of oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ such as 
cognitive states, processes, abilities, habits and so forth.6 These attitudes are (at least partly) 
associative states that relate an object to a valence, and can be thought as positive or negative 
affective states.7  
This paper has two main aims: (i) to show that humility comprises both modesty and 
self- acceptance; and (ii) to provide an original account of intellectual humility which identifies 
it with a cluster of attitudes. It is divided into 6 sections. In the first I highlight the heterogeneity 
of behaviours that have been taken in the philosophical and psychological literature to 
                                                     
3 Strictly speaking Driver is concerned with modesty rather than humility. Since several commentators have taken 
modesty and humility to be near synonyms, her views have been generally interpreted as offering an account of 
humility. Driver herself thinks that modesty and humility are not very dissimilar, but that underestimation is only 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐ of ŵodestǇ ;ϭϵϴϵ, Ŷ ϱ, p. ϯϳϴͿ. Heƌe, I folloǁ the ĐoŵŵoŶ pƌaĐtiĐe of tƌeatiŶg Dƌiǀeƌ͛s as aŶ aĐĐouŶt 
of humility. 
4 Other taxonomies have been offered. For example, Whitcomb et al. (2015) list three accounts (Proper Belief, 
Underestimation of Strength, Low Concern) to which they add their own Limitation Owning account. In my view 
Proper Belief and Limitation Owning are accuracy-based accounts whilst Underestimation of Strength and Low 
Concern are ignorance-based accounts. 
5 I use the distinction between hot and cold cognition to separate states such as belief that do not involve arousal 
from states such as desire and emotion which do. See Thagard et al (2006). 
6 I use the eǆpƌessioŶ ͚ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ͛ ;oƌ ŵake-up) broadly to include any cognitive states and capacities which 
are attributable to the subject. I do not take the notion to imply that the subject has voluntary control over the 
constituents of her agency. 
7 This notion of an attitude is the central construct of social psychology. See Banaji & Heiphetz (2010). It is not to 
be confused with that of an attitude toward a proposition. 
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characterise intellectual humility. In the second section I distinguish modesty from proper pride 
aďout oŶe͛s iŶtelleĐtual aĐhieǀeŵeŶts. I aƌgue that ŵodestǇ aďout oŶe͛s oǁŶ episteŵiĐ 
successes is not to be understood as necessitating either ignorance, or a lack of concern, about 
theŵ. IŶstead, ŵodestǇ ƌeƋuiƌes that oŶe͛s eǀaluatioŶ of these suĐĐesses is a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of 
their epistemic qualities rather than resulting from concerns with how they may reflect on 
oŶe͛s soĐial ƌeputatioŶ oƌ self-esteem. Section three provides an account of self-acceptance as 
ĐoŵpƌisiŶg aŶ eǀaluatioŶ of oŶe͛s iŶtelleĐtual liŵitatioŶs ďased oŶ theiƌ episteŵiĐ featuƌes 
without attending to matters of self-esteem or social standing. Although self-acceptance 
requiƌes a ƌealistiĐ assessŵeŶt of oŶe͛s iŶtelleĐtual liŵitatioŶs, it does Ŷot depeŶd oŶ 
possessing an especially high degree of accuracy in this regard. In section four I argue that 
modesty and self-acceptance are distinct but are often found together because of a 
psychological need to reduce cognitive dissonance. In section 5 I develop, and begin to defend, 
an account of intellectual humility as a virtue based on stable attitudes directed toward aspects 
of oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ that seƌǀe the knowledge and value-expressive functions. In section 6 
I defend the account further, answer some plausible objections, and highlight some of its 
consequences. 
 
 
1. Heterogeneity of manifestations 
 
Even a cursory glance at the behaviours and at the cognitive, conative and emotional states 
that are generally taken to be characteristic of humility reveals them to be a heterogeneous 
ďuŶĐh. TheǇ aƌguaďlǇ iŶĐlude: ďeiŶg a teaŵ plaǇeƌ, Ŷot oǀeƌestiŵatiŶg oŶe͛s aĐhieǀeŵeŶts, 
aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg oŶe͛s ŵistakes; Ŷot ďeiŶg eŶǀious of otheƌs͛ suĐĐess; Ŷot seekiŶg hoŶouƌs ďut 
caring about knowledge and truth; not boasting; being aware and forgiving of human 
intellectual shortcomings and frailties. Given this heterogeneity, it is no surprise that several 
philosophical accounts of humility, and its intellectual version intellectual humility, have been 
developed which are very different from each other. Whilst some psychologists appear to be 
simply accepting of the heterogeneity (Tangney 2002, pp. 412-13), philosophers seek some 
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underlying unity to it. In this I am no exception, although in my account humility has two 
distinct aspects which are best thought as forming a single more complex virtue only because of 
the psychological connections that hold between them. 
We can begin to impose some order on the heterogeneity by noting that some beliefs, 
behaviours, emotions, and motivations thought to be characteristic of humility are directed 
toward features of the self, whilst others are directed at features of other people (cf. Byerly, 
2014). AcknowledgiŶg oŶe͛s eƌƌoƌs is aŶ eǆaŵple of the fiƌst kiŶd. GiǀiŶg otheƌs Đƌedit foƌ theiƌ 
contribution to a collective achievement is an example of the second.8 In addition to these two 
distinct directions of focus toward self or toward others another important distinguishing 
featuƌe of the ŵaŶifestatioŶs of huŵilitǇ is a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe liŵitatioŶs aŶd 
shoƌtĐoŵiŶgs oƌ ǁith oŶe͛s iŶtelleĐtual aďilities, aĐhieǀeŵeŶts oƌ suĐĐesses. Foƌ eǆaŵple, 
aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg oŶe͛s eƌƌoƌs is iŶdiĐatiǀe of a foĐus oŶ liŵitations; whilst not boasting, rejecting 
flatteƌǇ, adŵiƌiŶg otheƌs͛ aĐhieǀeŵeŶts, eǆeŵplifǇ a focus on abilities and successes. 
As a result, there appear to be four dimensions to intellectual humility: concern for the 
limitations of the self; concern for the liŵitatioŶs of otheƌs; ĐoŶĐeƌŶ foƌ oŶe͛s oǁŶ suĐĐesses 
aŶd fiŶallǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ foƌ those of otheƌs. Thus, if aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg oŶe͛s oǁŶ iŶtelleĐtual 
shoƌtĐoŵiŶgs oƌ eǀeŶ siŵplǇ oŶe͛s oǁŶ finitude are examples of care directed at the limitations 
of the self, beiŶg uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aďout otheƌs͛ ƌeasoŶaďle eƌƌoƌs ǁould ďe aŶ eǆaŵple of 
concern for those of others. Similarly, if being a team player is an instance of care for oŶe͛s 
successes, giving credit would be a case of concern for the achievements of others. It may be 
tempting to conclude that humility is simply appropriate care for the limitations and successes 
of self and others. In a sense this is broadly ĐoƌƌeĐt if ͞appƌopƌiate Đaƌe͟ is Đashed out iŶ the 
right way. Intellectual humility, I argue, is not a matter of knowledge (or ignorance) about 
intellectual features of the self and of other epistemic agents. Rather humility is a special kind 
of concern for the intellectual features of the self. What characterises the intellectually humble 
person is the manner in which she cares about her cognitive make-up. Her evaluations of its 
components are based on their epistemic worth rather than, for instance, on considerations of 
social status and self-esteem. Humility is also indirectly related to concerns with the epistemic 
                                                     
8 It may be thought that this behaviour is an expression of intellectual generosity rather than humility. I agree, but I 
mention it here as it has been taken by some to be crucial to humility. See especially Nuyen (1998). 
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qualities of other agents because of its connections with other virtues, such as proper pride, 
which involve fair rankings of individuals for their epistemic worth. 
In what follows I first describe concerns with successes before discussing the manner in 
which the humble attends to her limitations. 
 
 
2. Intellectual modesty 
 
Intellectual modesty is the dimension of intellectual humility that focuses on oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ 
successes. It is reflected in the willingness to be a team player, to carry out unglamorous but 
ŶeĐessaƌǇ tasks, to ƌefƌaiŶ fƌoŵ ďoastiŶg aďout the oƌigiŶalitǇ of oŶe͛s ǀieǁs oƌ the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe 
of oŶe͛s ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to a ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐhieǀeŵent. Other characteristic behaviours and affective 
responses that have been associated with intellectual modesty include giving others credit for 
their contributions, not being envious of their successes, not seeking honours or fame for 
oneself at the expense of others. 
The family of views that thinks of humility as requiring something like ignorance focuses 
on what I shall call the modesty dimension of humility. For Driver (1989), humility entails 
igŶoƌaŶĐe oƌ uŶdeƌestiŵatioŶ of oŶe͛s suĐĐesses. Theƌefoƌe, oŶe is huŵďle oŶlǇ if eitheƌ oŶe 
does not believe that one has achieved anything of significance or one͛s ďeliefs aďout the 
sigŶifiĐaŶĐe of oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ suĐĐesses aƌe false ďeĐause theǇ uŶdeƌestiŵate it. I plaĐe 
GaƌĐia͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ aĐĐouŶt of huŵilitǇ as ďeiŶg uŶiŵpƌessed ǁith oŶeself ǁithiŶ this faŵilǇ despite 
its diffeƌeŶĐes fƌoŵ Dƌiǀeƌ͛s positioŶ. Foƌ GaƌĐia, huŵilitǇ is Ŷot a ŵatteƌ of ďelief aďout oŶe͛s 
successes. Instead, humility is characterised by the absence of a range of conative attitudes 
toward them. For example, one does not take delight, dwell or wishes to draw attention to 
them. In general, the humble person does not pay attention to her good intellectual features; 
this is what it would mean to say that one is unimpressed with oneself.9 Thus, whilst for Driver, 
                                                     
9 Boŵŵaƌito͛s ǀieǁ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ that ŵodestǇ is a ǀiƌtue of atteŶtioŶ is iŶ this ƌegaƌd Đlose to GaƌĐia͛s. 
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the humble is ignorant of her successes; for Garcia, the humble may be aware of what they are, 
but she ignores them anyway. 10 
Some of the problems faced by these views are well-known. Firstly, it is at best unclear 
how ignorance or the error of underestimation can be required by virtue. 11 Secondly, ignorance 
of oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ suĐĐesses is not necessary for humility. We can easily think of an individual 
who knows what she has achieved and appreciates its importance but who is nonetheless 
humble.12 A brilliant scientist, for example, may be fully aware of the significance of her 
discovery and appreciate that she played a pivotal role in the research that led to it, without 
thereby demonstrating a lack of humility. Thirdly, humility is not incompatible with taking 
delight iŶ oŶe͛s suĐĐess, since it is possible to be proud of, but humble about, oŶe͛s 
achievements. The same brilliant scientist could, without arrogance or vanity, experience a 
sense of satisfaction and elation at her results. 
FouƌthlǇ, igŶoƌaŶĐe oƌ uŶdeƌestiŵatioŶ of oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ suĐĐesses is Ŷot suffiĐieŶt foƌ 
modesty. It seems perfectly possible that a person may underestimate her successes without 
being humble. For instance, the person who is intellectually self-abasing tends to attribute her 
successes to mere luck or to overestimate the contribution to them made by others; she may 
also underestimate the significance of any achievement that she is willing to attribute to 
herself. However, we would not say that this person manifests humility; rather we would say 
that this person belittles her own abilities and successes. 
Fifthly, eǀeŶ oǀeƌestiŵatioŶ of the ŵagŶitude of oŶe͛s suĐĐesses is iŶ soŵe 
circumstances compatible with modesty about them. For example, the brilliant scientist may 
manifest humility even though she overestimates the significance of her research. She may 
honestly believe that her discovery is a turning point in the development of therapies against 
cancer. If it turns out that she was wrong, her mistake could be a genuine error rather than 
                                                     
10 I take the account offered by Roberts and Woods (2003; 2007) to share this featuƌe of GaƌĐia͛s positioŶ. IŶ 
another regard, namely in the requirement that intellectual humility requires a concern with epistemic goods, 
‘oďeƌts aŶd Woods͛ ǀieǁs aƌe Đloseƌ to ŵiŶe. 
11 It is hard to see how ignorance or false belief could be required by a virtue, let alone an intellectual one (Garcia, 
2006, n 6, p. 419). 
12 Here and throughout the paper I am concerned with modesty as a trait of character. It is possible for someone to 
be modest about some successes and not others. I presume that the modest person is the individual who is 
modest about most (if not all) of her most significant epistemic successes in most contexts. 
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evidence of immodesty.13 These five considerations support the conclusion that intellectual 
modesty is not a matter of underestimating, or being ignorant about, the signifiĐaŶĐe of oŶe͛s 
successes. It also does not require not being impressed by them.  
Modesty, therefore, is not to be identified in negative terms with the absence of true 
ďeliefs aďout oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ suĐĐess oƌ ǁith the aďseŶĐe of positiǀe affeĐtiǀe states diƌeĐted at 
them. Rather the examples presented above indicate that modesty concerns the motives or 
Đauses foƌ a peƌsoŶ͛s positiǀe staŶĐe toǁaƌd heƌ episteŵiĐ successes. She must value them 
because of their epistemic value rather than for their contribution to enhancing her social 
standing or to increasing her sense of self-esteem.14 Hence, modesty is compatible with 
knowledge of, satisfaction and delight with, one͛s episteŵiĐ suĐĐesses ďut oŶlǇ if the delight oƌ 
satisfaction is derived from the nature and magnitude of the success rather than from its 
reflection on oneself.15 
I haǀe aƌgued that ŵodestǇ aďout oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ suĐĐesses is Đoŵpatiďle ǁith pƌopeƌ 
pride about achievements. Nevertheless, these two traits of character are different. Modesty is 
aŶ attitude toǁaƌd oŶe͛s oǁŶ epistemic successes that values them for their epistemic positive 
qualities. Proper pride is a concern that credit is appropriately attriďuted to oŶe foƌ oŶe͛s oǁŶ 
epistemic achievements. There are, therefore, two fundamental differences between modesty 
and proper pride. First, one can be modest about epistemic successes which are not 
achievements because they are the result of innate endowments or because they are very easy 
to obtain.16 However, one cannot be properly proud of these. Pride in these cases would 
intuitively qualify as somewhat vicious. Second, modesty is not a concern with the allocation of 
                                                     
13 However, we would not think of someone, who is grossly and consistently off the mark about the significance of 
her successes, that she is modest. Instead, we may label her a fool. Nevertheless, despite her gross overestimation, 
we may not think that she is arrogant either. It would seem therefore that there is no conceptual connection 
ďetǁeeŶ ŵodestǇ aŶd aďseŶĐe of oǀeƌestiŵatioŶ of oŶe͛s suĐĐesses oƌ aƌƌogaŶĐe aŶd the pƌeseŶĐe of suĐh 
overestimate. These points are consistent with thinking that as a matter of fact modest people are on average 
more accurate about the importance of their epistemic successes than those who are arrogant. 
14 One should not conclude from these claims that agents must be consciously aware of their motivations for 
valuing some aspects of their cognitive make-up but not others. 
15 I resort here to talk about concern, care or valuing. In section 5 I explain how it should be interpreted. For now, I 
would warn the reader against reading it to mean anything more than the attribution to agents of evaluative and 
affective cognitive states of approval or disapproval of some features of the self. 
16 A discussion of the features that a success must possess to count as an achievement is beyond the scope of the 
paper. I take it that an agent may not be praiseworthy for all her successes but is always deserving of praise for her 
achievements. 
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epistemic credit or the attribution of authority. Proper pride, instead, is the virtue of having 
appƌopƌiate ƌegaƌd foƌ oŶe͛s esteem. HeŶĐe, pƌopeƌ pƌide is a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ that oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ 
aĐhieǀeŵeŶts aƌe pƌopeƌlǇ Đƌedited to oŶe, aŶd that oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ authoƌitǇ is adeƋuatelǇ 
recognised. For these reasons Whitcomb et al. are mistaken to identify proper pride as the 
ǀiƌtue ǁhiĐh ƌelates to episteŵiĐ suĐĐesses iŶ the ŵaŶŶeƌ iŶ ǁhiĐh ǁhat theǇ Đall ͞huŵilitǇ͟ 
relates to epistemic limitations (2015, p. 22).  
Because modesty is compatible with proper pride, the individual who is modest needs 
not be totally oblivious to how she is regarded by others. An attempt to gain the recognition 
which one deserves, and of which one may wrongly be deprived, is not immodest if its aims are 
to maintain self-respect and to address failures in the social epistemic practices for the 
generation and transmission of knowledge and other epistemic goods.17 
The intellectually modest individual may also be intellectually generous. If she is, she will 
give others the credit they are due for their role in her successes. I suspect that intellectually 
modest people will tend as a matter of fact to be also generous. In so far as the person who is 
modest does not have an inflated sense of her self-worth and is not after honours or 
recognition for their own sake, she will have little incentive to deny others the credit they 
deserve. Once again, it is perfectly possible that the generous person may make a genuine 
ĐogŶitiǀe ŵistake aďout the ŵagŶitude of aŶotheƌ peƌsoŶ͛s ĐoŶtƌiďution. Were she to make 
this error, she would not become ungenerous as a result, provided that she would feel regret if 
she became aware of her mistake. 
It has been argued by Julia Driver that if one is modest, it is self-defeating to claim (or 
think) that one has this trait (1989, p. 375). This is the well-known self-attribution paradox 
which has been much discussed in the subsequent literature on the topic.18 The initial 
characterization of modesty offered here can explain why a claim made about oneself that one 
is modest is likely to be immodest or at least provide evidence against its truth. In most 
circumstances such an assertion would be in itself an example of immodesty. But even when 
                                                     
17 She may especially care about such an acknowledgement when it is instrumental to achieving other goods. For 
example, a politician who is intellectually humble may, without vanity, care that her views are held in high regard 
by others because she needs to be elected to implement her good policies (Garcia, 2006 n 23 p. 423 modifying 
Driver, 2001, p. 23). In my view this person exhibits a form of pride which is compatible with modesty. 
18 See Garcia (2006), pp. 427-8; Whitcomb et al. (2015), pp. 26-28. 
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the assertion is not a boast, its utterance often is evidence that the individual is not modest. 
With the exception of special circumstances, such as being asked by a psychologist to describe 
oŶe͛s ĐhaƌaĐteƌ, deĐlaƌatioŶs of ŵodestǇ aƌe ŵost likelǇ to seƌǀe the puƌpose of ŵakiŶg oŶe 
feel better about oneself. Such declarations thus are ego-boosts. They are however unlikely to 
work for individuals who have a deflated sense of self-worth (although they may in a few cases) 
since attending to the modesty of their achievements might further depress their self-esteem. 
In all likelihood, therefore, claiming modesty is a way of inflating an already inflated sense of 
self-worth. For this reason, its utterance is usually psychological evidence of the falsity of the 
claim. 
 
 
3. Intellectual self-acceptance 
 
Modesty about intellectual successes does not exhaust the range of characteristic responses of 
the intellectually humble person. Humility is also importantly concerned with human limitations 
iŶ geŶeƌal aŶd oŶe͛s oǁŶ liŵitatioŶs iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ. This diŵeŶsioŶ of huŵilitǇ is ŵaŶifested iŶ 
the awe which is felt by us in the presence of forces that makes us feel small such as the 
strength of a storm at sea. A typical intellectual manifestation of this aspect of humility is the 
aďilitǇ to aĐkŶoǁledge oŶe͛s oǁŶ eƌƌoƌs oƌ shoƌtĐoŵiŶgs, ƌatheƌ than to deny them. As a result, 
the intellectually humble person is likely to accept fair criticisms with equanimity and is not 
resentful of them. Consequently, this kind of person is also likely to possess the virtue of open-
mindedness because she has no interest in covering up or denying her own limitations. 
The ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith oŶe͛s oǁŶ liŵitatioŶs is aŶ aspeĐt of huŵilitǇ ǁhiĐh is ĐoŶĐeptuallǇ 
distiŶĐt fƌoŵ ŵodestǇ. I Đall this aspeĐt ͚self-aĐĐeptaŶĐe͛. The laďel is apt ďeĐause the peƌsoŶ 
who possesses this quality is accepting of limitations that she attributes to herself. The 
diŵeŶsioŶ of huŵilitǇ ǁhiĐh I Đall ͚self-aĐĐeptaŶĐe͛ is the foĐus of the faŵilǇ of ǀieǁs that take 
huŵilitǇ to ďe aŶ aĐĐuƌate assessŵeŶt of oŶe͛s oǁŶ liŵitatioŶs. Foƌ “Ŷoǁ ;ϭϵϵϱͿ huŵility is a 
form of self-kŶoǁledge of oŶe͛s liŵitatioŶs. Foƌ Hazlett it is a ŵatteƌ of haǀiŶg a pƌopeƌ 
assessment of the episteŵiĐ statuses of oŶe͛s fiƌst-order doxastic attitudes (2012).  
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AĐĐeptaŶĐe of oŶe͛s oǁŶ iŶtelleĐtual liŵitatioŶs, hoǁeǀeƌ, is Ŷot to ďe identified with 
knowledge of what they are. An individual may have developed a keen awareness of her 
limitations which is she determined to cover up; she may also be hiding these aspects of the 
self because she wishes to receive praise. Thus, for example, a student may know that she does 
not understand a theory or a concept, but she may attempt to cover up the fact by repeating 
word by word formulations which she finds in a textbook. Despite her knowledge of her 
limitations, this student would not be manifesting humility if she behaved in this way. Humility, 
as self-acceptance, would require instead that she admits to her lack of understanding and 
either seeks assistance or thinks harder about the topic. Self-knowledge of limitations is thus 
not sufficient for humility. It is also not necessary. A person may have underestimated a 
limitation because of a genuine cognitive error. For example, a person trusting her memory, 
even if in fact it is no longer what it used to be, may tend not write down appointments in her 
diary and miss a few meetings as a result. This behaviour does not per se display a lack of 
huŵilitǇ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, if this peƌsoŶ͛s ŵotiǀatioŶ foƌ tƌustiŶg heƌ ŵeŵoƌǇ is that she thiŶks people 
would be impressed by her ability to recall, we would be tempted to think of her as vain and as 
laĐkiŶg iŶ huŵilitǇ. “o huŵilitǇ is a foĐus oŶ oŶe͛s oǁŶ liŵitatioŶs ǁhiĐh is Ŷot dƌiǀeŶ ďǇ a 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶ foƌ hoǁ theiƌ pƌeseŶĐe ƌefleĐts oŶ oŶe͛s ƌeputatioŶ oƌ self-esteem. 
Intellectual self-acceptance can thus be initially characterised as a matter of being 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith oƌ aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg oŶe͛s liŵitatioŶs aŶd fƌeelǇ adŵittiŶg to theŵ. IŶ oƌdeƌ to 
care about these, one must have some awareness of their existence and extent, although one 
need not be exceptionally reliable about them. However, the most significant feature of self-
acceptance is that it is a form of concern, rather than a kind of knowledge. This concern with 
oŶe͛s putatiǀe liŵitatioŶs is diƌeĐted toǁaƌd theiƌ episteŵiĐ Ƌualities ƌatheƌ thaŶ the faĐt that 
they are oŶe͛s oǁŶ. HeŶĐe, self-acceptance is a way of caring that one has limitations because 
of their effects on the pursuit of various epistemic goods such as truth or understanding, rather 
thaŶ foƌ theiƌ poteŶtial iŵpaĐt oŶ oŶe͛s ƌeputatioŶ oƌ oŶe͛s seŶse of self-esteem. 
A ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith oŶe͛s liŵitatioŶs ŵaǇ geŶeƌate eitheƌ a seŶse of defeatisŵ aŶd 
resignation, or a desire to address them with a view to improve. In the self-accepting individual, 
the concern for limitations motivates actions to address these defects. This person seeks to 
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remedy those shortcomings that can be lessened, circumvent those which she cannot change, 
or when nothing else can be done take her limitations into account in her behaviour. In 
conclusion, self-aĐĐeptaŶĐe is a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ foƌ oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ liŵitatioŶs ďeĐause of theiƌ 
epistemic impact which motivates one to remedial action. 
This aspeĐt of ŵǇ ǀieǁ ŵaǇ appeaƌ to haǀe a Đlose siŵilaƌitǇ to WhitĐoŵď et al.͛s 
Limitations-Owning account (2015). Both approaches associate humility with a stable 
dispositioŶ to haǀe a ƌealistiĐ assessŵeŶt of oŶe͛s iŶtelleĐtual shoƌtfalls, to ƌegƌet the faĐt that 
one has these limitations, to admit to their existence, and to take them seriously by addressing 
them (2015, p. 11). However, these commonalities hide significant differences.19 First, I suspect 
that ǁe do Ŷot iŶteƌpƌet ͞adŵittiŶg of oŶe͛s iŶtelleĐtual liŵitatioŶs͟ iŶ the saŵe ǁaǇ. 
Whitcomb et al. think of admittance as a matter of not being in denial about the existence of 
oŶe͛s liŵitatioŶs, so that oŶe ǁould kŶoǁ aďout theŵ aŶd take theŵ iŶto aĐĐouŶt iŶ oŶe͛s 
reasoning. For this reason, I believe that their account ultimately takes humility to be a virtue of 
accuracy. In my view, instead, adŵittiŶg of oŶe͛s oǁŶ iŶtelleĐtual liŵitatioŶ is also a ŵatteƌ of 
being disposed fully to reveal them to others even when doing so may go agaiŶst oŶe͛s self-
interest. 
Second, and as a result of the first disagreement, we also are of different opinion as to 
whether it is psychologically possible for a person to be intellectually humble whilst being 
exclusively motivated by self-interest. I deny this possibility; instead, Whitcomb and colleagues 
Đlaiŵ that oŶe ĐaŶ oǁŶ oŶe͛s liŵitatioŶs aŶd thus ďe iŶtellectually humble even though one is 
primarily or even exclusively motivated by self-interest. In these cases, one would possess the 
dispositions constitutive of humility but would not possess the virtue because one would lack 
the appropriate motivation which is a non-instrumental commitment to truth or other 
epistemic goods. Hence, in their view virtue requires aiming at epistemic goods for their own 
sake, but possession of the relevant character trait can be had non-virtuously when an 
                                                     
19 There are also other significant differences between our views. I mentioned above in section 2 a disagreement 
about the notion of proper pride. I also differ from them because, as I argue in section 4 below, I think that 
humility is as much concerned with epistemic successes as it is with limitations. 
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individual has the required stable disposition but her concern for the epistemic goods it 
produces is non-existent or merely instrumental. 
They offer two examples of non-virtuous humility. The first is a greedy manager whose 
company values intellectual humility. In order to advaŶĐe his Đaƌeeƌ this ŵaŶageƌ ͞Ŷeeds to get 
his eŵploǇees to ƌate hiŵ highlǇ oŶ͟ iŶtelleĐtual huŵilitǇ ;ϮϬϭϱ, p. ϭϮͿ, he - thus - cultivates the 
qualities associated with humility and succeeds in acquiring them. The second is a student who 
succeeds in developing the same traits whilst being solely motivated by the desire to get good 
grades because they are conducive to economic success (2015, pp. 12-13). These are both 
examples of individuals who are not non-instrumentally motivated to seek the truth as they are 
wholly driven by greed or self-promotion. 
Without wishing simply to trade intuitions, I do not see that either of these two 
individuals can exemplify a humble disposition which is cross-situationally stable.20 The greedy 
manager, as the description offered by Whitcomb and colleagues makes clear, cares solely that 
they are perceived by others as humble; he does not care that he is humble, not even as a 
means to his greedy ends. The development of the traits possessed by humble individuals is not 
the best strategy to pursue for one who wants to appear humble. False modesty will achieve 
the same end in a more cost effective way.  
But suppose this ŵaŶageƌ͛s eŵploǇees aƌe paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ apt at spottiŶg false ŵodestǇ. 
Therefore, the manager decides to try to cultivate humility itself, rather than just its 
appearance, as a mere means to career advancement. It would seem that he cannot succeed 
unless he also changes his motivations. Even in a company that values humility there are 
limitations such that to admit to them is to admit incompetence. The humble person is 
nevertheless disposed to admit to these in front of colleagues knowing that it will damage any 
chance of promotion. The greedy manager, who develops dispositions associated with humility, 
would not freely admit to his limitations were he to find himself in this situation. He would not 
because in such an instance the display of humble behaviour is an obstacle to the achievement 
of his goal. Hence, his humble-like dispositions are not the same as those possessed by the truly 
humble individual since they have a narrower range of manifestations. 
                                                     
20 Stability across situations is essential for dispositions which are character traits. 
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Further, in many other marginal cases this individual will have to weigh up which 
behaviours are more likely to increase his chances of promotion on a given occasion. He will 
sometimes choose behaviours consonant with humility and at other times behaviours which 
are not humble. The genuinely humble person would not need to engage in all this weighing-up 
of options. I suspect that individuals like the greedy manager would over time change their 
motives and dispositions so that they would end up in one of three possible positions. First, one 
may become virtuously humble (and stop caring much about the promotion). Second, one may 
merely pretend to be humble when doing so is advantageous. Third, one may become rather 
aŵďiǀaleŶt aŶd alloǁ oŶe͛s dispositioŶs assoĐiated ǁith huŵilitǇ to ďe Đƌoss-situationally 
unstable depending on whether self-promotion or acceptance of limitations directs his 
behaviour on a given occasion.21 
Similar considerations undermine the plausibility of the example of the humble but 
entirely grade-driven student. It is plausible, and true, that many students are motivated both 
by caring for grades but also caring for truth and understanding. These students may exhibit a 
certain degree of humility. The example offered by Whitcomb and colleagues (2015) is 
different. This is an individual who only cares for the grades and for the economic success that 
they promote but tries to develop the traits associated with humility exclusively as a means to 
iŵpƌoǀe heƌ gƌades. EǀeŶ assuŵiŶg that ďeiŶg aǁaƌe of oŶe͛s liŵitatioŶs, aǀoidiŶg aŶǇ 
temptation to delude oneself about their extent and studying hard to remedy them is the best 
poliĐǇ to iŵpƌoǀe oŶe͛s gƌades,22 it is hard to see why this student would freely admit to her 
limitations in a range of circumstances in which a student who is truly humble would. For 
instance, if the grade for the course has a self-assessment component, the grade-driven student 
would ceteris paribus inflate her grade, whilst the humble student would not. The grade-driven 
student usually would admit to limitations in front of teachers and other students only when 
doing so may help her in the endeavour of improving her grades, but would not do so when the 
                                                     
21 In this third case one will have stopped calculating and instinctively choose self-promotion or humility on 
different occasions. 
22 Alternatively, we can assume that this student is morally honest and would not consider cheating. 
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revelation may be thought to create expectations in the grader which may lead to lower 
marks.23 The humble student would freely admit to her limitations in these circumstances. 
In sum, contrary to appearances, it is not possible for an individual to manifest all the 
qualities of humility in a cross-situationally stable manner, but be motivated to pursue only 
selfish eŶds. No selfish iŶdiǀidual ĐaŶ ďe tƌulǇ huŵďle ďeĐause oǁŶiŶg oƌ aĐĐeptiŶg oŶe͛s 
limitations requires more than not being in denial about their existence. It also necessitates 
that oŶe is opeŶ aďout theŵ iŶ fƌoŶt of otheƌs eǀeŶ iŶ situatioŶs ǁheƌe it is Ŷot to oŶe͛s 
advantage to do so. The greedy manager and the grade-driven student can admit to their 
limitations insofar as they need not harbour delusions about these, but they cannot admit to 
them in front of others in a sufficiently broad range of circumstances to warrant seeing this 
openness as a stable disposition.24 
 
 
4. Humility as modesty and selfaAcceptance 
 
The characterisations offered above helps to clarify the different shortcomings of existing 
philosophical theories about intellectual humility and to explain why such variety has 
proliferated. Humility has two dimensions. It concerns both successes and limitations. The 
ignorance-based accounts have focused on successes to the detriment of acknowledging 
limitations. The accuracy-based accounts have faced the opposite problem. In addition, these 
accounts have tended to mischaracterise the nature of the concern with successes and 
limitations. Some have taken the concern to be a matter of belief (or of its absence); others 
haǀe takeŶ huŵilitǇ to ƌeƋuiƌe a laĐk of positiǀe affeĐtiǀe oƌ ĐoŶatiǀe attitudes diƌeĐted at oŶe͛s 
successes. Contra Snow (1995), Whitcomb et al (2015), Hazlett (2012), and Driver (1989), the 
characterisation offered above illustrates that humility is not best thought as having (or lacking) 
                                                     
23 This can happen, for example, if expectations of low achievement in a student prompt the teacher not to give 
the benefit of the doubt in the case of unclear answer or to place the student in the less capable stream. 
24These examples show that intellectual humility is incompatible with overpowering selfish motivation. My analysis 
of these cases does not settle two further questions. The first is whether virtue requires virtuous conscious 
motivation since virtue may exclude the presence of some motivations without requiring the presence of any 
specific ones. The second is whether, granted that motivation is required, it must involve caring for epistemic 
goods non-instrumentally. 
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aĐĐuƌate oƌ iŶaĐĐuƌate ďeliefs aďout oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe featuƌes. Contra Garcia (2006) and Roberts 
and Wood (2007) it does not reƋuiƌe Ŷot ĐaƌiŶg foƌ oŶe͛s suĐĐesses. HuŵilitǇ iŶǀolǀes ĐaƌiŶg foƌ 
oŶe͛s liŵitatioŶs as WhitĐoŵď et al ;ϮϬϭϱͿ suggest. Hoǁeǀeƌ, contra them (2015), not every 
foƌŵ of ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith liŵitatioŶs is Đoŵpatiďle ǁith huŵilitǇ. OŶe͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ŵust ŵotiǀate oŶe 
to admit freely to theiƌ eǆisteŶĐe, eǀeŶ ǁheŶ doiŶg so is daŵagiŶg to oŶe͛s self-interest. 
One may note that my initial taxonomy of the beliefs, behaviours, motivations and 
emotions associated intellectual humility referred to psychological states and behavioural 
responses directed at others as well as some targeting the self. In my view it is only the latter 
group that can be properly included among the manifestations of intellectual humility. In this 
sense humility is self-centred. States and behaviours directed at others are not essential to 
humility although they are often associated with it. Often these affective and cognitive states 
and behaviours are manifestations of other intellectual virtues that promote, and are promoted 
by, humility. Thus, I have noted above that the modest person is also likely to be generous (and 
vice versa). Her modesty about her successes is thus accompanied by the generous 
acknowledgment of the contribution made by others. Similarly, the self-accepting person, who 
acknowledges heƌ liŵitatioŶs, is also likelǇ to ďe toleƌaŶt of otheƌs͛ geŶuiŶe eƌƌoƌs aŶd opeŶ 
minded to criticism. Hence, self-acceptance fosters intellectual equanimity or tolerance and 
open-mindedness.  
Humility is also self-centred in another sense. The humble person is not preoccupied 
with comparing her successes and limitations with those of other agents, nor does she care 
much for how others rank her in comparison with them. In other words, the humble person is 
not much concerned with pecking orders. Humility, however, does not require that one simply 
accepts intimidation, put downs or behaviour designed to humiliate from those who are very 
focused on such rankings and, typically, attempt to secure a reputational high status. So whilst 
humility per se comprises onlǇ oŶe͛s eǀaluatioŶs of oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe featuƌes, it is Ŷot 
incompatible with a demand (characteristic of proper pride) that one is given due epistemic 
credit by others. 
Modesty and self-acceptance are both parts of what we take humility to be and neither 
can be reduced to the other. It is possible that a person who, at least broadly speaking, accepts 
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her limitations and demonstrates this acceptance in the way she deals with criticism is at the 
same time arrogant about her successes. This is not uncommon among those whom we refer to 
as ͚ĐoĐkǇ͛. These iŶdiǀiduals haǀe a high opiŶioŶ of theiƌ iŶtelleĐtual aďilities aŶd pƌeseŶt 
themselves with confidence. Nevertheless, some of them are also remarkably open to criticism 
from those whom they regard as their peers.25 
It is also possiďle to ďe ŵodest aďout oŶe͛s suĐĐesses ǁithout fullǇ aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg oŶe͛s 
shortcomings. This phenomenon is not uncommon among folk who display a certain amount of 
rigidity in their approach to all matters intellectual. These individuals can be largely modest 
about the significance of their personal intellectual achievements but are somewhat uncritical 
of their settled views. They have become blinkered, dogmatic, and unable to listen to criticism. 
They do not think of themselves as intellectually special in any way; but are unable to see that 
they may not be right on many issues. At the most extreme end of this scale we may find those 
iŶdiǀiduals ǁho aƌe usuallǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚faŶatiĐs͛. These iŶdiǀiduals iŶ theiƌ deǀotioŶ to a 
cause, may be modest about their successes (and may even exhibit this modesty through their 
choice of clothing and diet), but have lost the ability to acknowledge their own individual 
intellectual limitations (although their awareness of human finitude may be heightened). 
These considerations indicate that modesty and self-acceptance are to some extent 
independent of each other. Hence, one may well wonder whether we should treat humility as 
the equivocal catch-all term for what are in reality two distinct traits. 
This conclusion is premature. It is true that modesty and self-acceptance can be 
exhibited somewhat independently of each other. Nevertheless, it seems likely that it may be 
psychologically hard to secure and preserve either true modesty or self-acceptance whilst being 
very deficient with regard to the other feature. Further, the development of modesty may 
promote the development of self-acceptance and vice-versa. As one acquires modesty about 
oŶe͛s oǁŶ suĐĐesses, oŶe͛s atteŶtioŶ ŵaǇ ďe dƌaǁŶ to oŶe͛s liŵitations which one may then 
learn to accept. By the same token, acceptance of limitations should generate some sort of 
                                                     
25 But they may be prone to misjudgements about whom to include as a peer. Although it is possible for someone 
to Đaƌe foƌ oŶe͛s suĐĐesses ďeĐause of hoǁ theǇ ƌefleĐt oŶ oŶe͛s oǁŶ self-estimation whilst freely admitting to 
mistakes and limitations, these two tendencies are in psychological conflict since admitting to mistakes damages 
oŶe͛s estiŵatioŶ of oŶe͛s successes. For my purposes, it is sufficient to show that it is possible for individuals to 
possess this kind of conflicted psychology. 
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ĐogŶitiǀe dissoŶaŶĐe ǁith oŶe͛s teŶdeŶĐǇ to iŵŵodestǇ. 26 It thus makes sense to think of 
humility as a cluster of two conceptually distinct psychological features which tend to 
harmonise because of the psychological need to avoid cognitive dissonance. 
 
 
5. Humility as a cluster of attitudes 
 
In this section I present my account of intellectual humility as a cluster of strong attitudes and 
offer some reasons in its support, before offering a fuller defence of the view in the next 
section. I have argued so far that humility is characterised by a concern toward one's own 
epistemic successes and limitations. It follows that humility is a psychological quality which is 
involved in the evaluation of aspects of oŶe͛s oǁŶ ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ. Yet it ǁould seeŵ possiďle 
for a person to be humble without having ever consciously thought about her own successes or 
limitations. The account provided below explains how humility can be unreflective and yet 
diƌeĐted toǁaƌd aspeĐts of the suďjeĐt͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ. It ĐaŶ also eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ huŵilitǇ is a 
kind of affective evaluative stance rather than a purely cold cognitive one. Finally, since 
attitudes can guide future behaviour, patterns of attention and emotional responses, this 
position accounts for the characteristic manifestations of humility. 
Before I present my view, however, I want to pre-empt two possible confusions which 
may arise if one draws too close a connection between the view developed here and 
discussions on meta-cognition. The first confusion would pƌesuŵe that attitudes aďout oŶe͛s 
own cognitive agency and its components must be thoughts about oŶe͛s oǁŶ thoughts or at 
least presuppose these. This ĐoŶĐlusioŶ is uŶǁaƌƌaŶted siŶĐe ŵoŶitoƌiŶg aŶd ƌegulatiŶg oŶe͛s 
cognitive activity does not require that one forms conscious thoughts about it (Proust, 2013). 
Instead, self-assessment can be carried out in a habitual quasi-automatic fashion that does not 
take the form of conscious reflection. The account developed here presumes that mature 
human beings have an overall impression of their intellectual strengths and weaknesses as 
                                                     
26 The discomfort generated by the perceived conflict between self-accepting and immodest attitudes should lead 
one to seek to resolve the tension by modifying at least one of the conflicting attitudes. For an accessible 
introduction to the literature on cognitive dissonance see Cooper (2008). 
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result of on-going evaluations of their cognitive features. These evaluations may be sometimes 
based on conscious reflection on past experiences, but may often be the outcome of lessons 
learnt unthinkingly. 
The second confusion is to misconstrue the account I defend as proposing that humility 
is a second-order virtue of accuracy. In order to avoid this interpretation, it is necessary to note 
that attitudes, which - as I explain below - are summary evaluations of their objects, are not the 
same psychological states as those laďelled ͚eǀaluatioŶs͛ in the psychological literature on 
meta-cognition. These are validity tags; which is to say, implicit endorsements of something as 
true or accurate (Proust, 2013). Attitudes in social psychology are evaluations conceived as (at 
least partly) associative states that link an object to a positive or negative valence. Hence, a 
positive evaluation of a cognitive process or capacity is a preference for it, whilst a negative 
evaluation is a dislike for that object (Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010). The psychological notion of an 
attitude should not be confused with the philosophical notion of a propositional attitude. A 
liking of chocolate is an example of the former, a belief that 2 plus 2 is 4 of the latter. 27 
These preferences are cognitive shortcuts, based on experience, that suŵŵaƌise oŶe͛s 
overall evaluation of an object (Fazio and Olson, 2007, p. 141). The evaluation is formed over 
time to serve a variety of functions. For instance, one may form a dislike for some food stuff 
having felt unwell after eating it on several occasions. The negative attitude toward that object 
once formed guides avoidant behaviour away from the disliked object without needing to 
ƌeheaƌse oŶe͛s ƌeasons for that behaviour. In this example, the evaluation was formed to serve 
a utilitarian function because it classifies as liked those objects whose pursuit furthers the 
ageŶt͛s self-interests and as disliked those whose avoidance serves those same interests. Whilst 
the categorisation of attitude function is still a matter of some dispute, there is agreement 
about a core group of these. They are: knowledge, utilitarian, object appraisal, social-adjustive, 
ego-defensive and value-expressive functions (Fazio, 2000; Maio et al. 2004). Attitudes can 
serve more than one of these at the same time. 
                                                     
27 Social psychologists tend to think of attitudes and even of their bases in purely associative terms (Maio and 
Haddock, 2004). There are grounds to suspect that, even though the attitudes themselves may be purely 
associative, their bases include propositional states. See Levy͛s ;ϮϬϭϱ). 
 19 
 
It has been argued that all attitudes serve an object appraisal function (Fazio, 2000). 
Unfortunately, the notion is, in places, used tautologically to mean evaluations that serve the 
function of evaluating. It is thus no surprise that all attitudes serve this function.28 It is also a 
pity that the object-appraisal function is conflated in the literature with two further functions: 
utilitarian (Watt et al., 2008) and knowledge (Katz, 1960).29 The knowledge function, as 
originally conceived, is different from the utilitarian function. The latter classifies objects in 
aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith ǁhetheƌ appƌoaĐhiŶg oƌ aǀoidiŶg theŵ seƌǀes the ageŶt͛s iŶteƌests. IŶstead, 
the former can be driven by curiosity and serves the need to know or understand objects for 
what they are. 
Evaluations that serve social-adjustiǀe fuŶĐtioŶs aƌe foƌŵed to adjust oŶe͛s pƌefeƌeŶĐes 
to those of oŶe͛s soĐial gƌoup. These attitudes aƌe positiǀe oƌ Ŷegatiǀe summary evaluations of 
objects which are based on the likes and dislikes shared by members of the group to which one 
belongs. Similarly, attitudes that serve an ego-defensive function are based on an assessment 
of whether the object is a threat to the self. Finally, value-expressive attitudes are summary 
eǀaluatioŶs of oďjeĐts foƌŵed to seƌǀe the Ŷeed to eǆpƌess oŶe͛s oǁŶ ǀalues.30,31 
Having thus offered an overview of the notion of an attitude as this is used in social 
psychology, I first characterise the attitudes that constitute intellectual humility before 
defending this identification. Intellectual humility I propose refers to a cluster of strong 
attitudes, the informational bases from which they are derived, and their consequences which 
include characteristic emotions, dispositions to behave and patterns of attention. The attitudes 
aƌe suŵŵaƌǇ eǀaluatioŶs of the suďjeĐt͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ aŶd its ĐoŵpoŶeŶts. Thus, foƌ 
eǆaŵple, oŶe ŵaǇ ďe positiǀe aďout oŶe͛s ǀisioŶ, ďut haǀe a Ŷegatiǀe attitude toǁaƌd oŶe͛s 
                                                     
28 It is equally no surprise that those attitudes that do it best are strong attitudes since it is these which are causally 
the most efficacious. 
29 For an example of the assimilation see Kruglanski and Strobe (2005). 
30 Thus, not all attitudes toward values are value-expressive and not all value-expressive attitudes have values as 
their objects. One may have a positive attitude toward equality which is formed because it satisfies the need to fit 
iŶ ǁith oŶe͛s IsliŶgtoŶ set. Also oŶe ŵaǇ haǀe a positiǀe attitude toǁaƌd oŶe͛s walking boots that plays a value-
expressive function ďeĐause it eǆpƌesses oŶe͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to a ƌaŶge of ǀalues suĐh as spiƌit of adǀeŶtuƌe, loǀe of 
feeling healthy and strong, and so forth. 
31 Social psychologists think of liking and valuing as nearly interchangeable notions despite clear differences 
between the two. In this paper I am largely concerned with attitudes as expressions of preferences. Value-
eǆpƌessiǀe attitudes aƌe pƌefeƌeŶĐes foƌ oďjeĐts ǁhiĐh oŶe takes to pƌoŵote oŶe͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts to oŶe͛s ǀalues. 
Thanks to Jonathan Webber for pressing me on the need to clarify this point. 
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hearing. Attitudes can be directed at beliefs or theories one may hold, as well as cognitive 
capacities. They may have habits or skills as their objects, and finally one may have an overall 
attitude toǁaƌd oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ as a ǁhole. “oŵe of these attitudes are positive and 
others are negative. Others still will be ambivalent.32 If, as social psychologists have argued, 
attitudes are the main construct of social cognition, there is no doubt that every individual has 
attitudes about oneself, about oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ aŶd aďout its ĐoŵpoŶeŶts. 
In my view these positive and negative evaluations of aspects of oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ŵake-
up are, in fact, assessment of them as strengths or epistemic successes or as weaknesses or 
epistemic limitations. Hence, for example, the person who has a positive attitude toward her 
memory is the person who, unthinkingly perhaps, assesses memory as one of her cognitive or 
epistemic strengths. This is so even when the positive evaluation of memory is actually formed 
to serve the need for self-esteem and is not based on an accurate judgement of the reliability of 
oŶe͛s ŵeŵoƌǇ. I take this poiŶt to be a consequence of the cognitive dissonance that would be 
caused by holding on to a positiǀe eǀaluatioŶ of soŵe aspeĐt of oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe agency whilst 
thinking that it does not promote epistemic goods. One cannot have a positive attitude toward 
oŶe͛s hearing without, for example, treating it as reliable. Similarly, one cannot maintain a 
positiǀe attitude toǁaƌd oŶe͛s positioŶ oŶ a giǀeŶ issue whilst also thiŶkiŶg that oŶe͛s ǀieǁ is 
the result of mere wishful thinking. These considerations apply to all those cognitive capacities, 
skills, habits, and to their products, which constitutively aim at accuracy, knowledge or truth.33 
Since these cognitive features are successes only when they promote epistemic goods, and one 
evaluates them positively only if one implicitly treats them as successes, a positive evaluation of 
one of these features of oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ŵake-up is tantamount to an assessment of it as an 
epistemic success. Similarly, a negative evaluation is an assessment of a feature as an epistemic 
limitation. 
                                                     
32 I do not address the issue of ambivalent attitudes. These are unstable (cf., Maio and Haddock, 2009, p. 34) and 
thus incompatible with virtue. 
33 This idea that there are such capacities is a staple of virtue epistemology. One prominent example is Sosa (2007, 
pp. 22-ϮϯͿ. IŶ the ƌeŵaiŶdeƌ of this seĐtioŶ ŵǇ disĐussioŶ of aspeĐts of aŶ ageŶt͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ should ďe takeŶ 
to be limited to those which are constitutively connected to epistemic goods unless otherwise specified. Not all 
cognitive capacities have this feature. For example, imagination does not aim at the truth or understanding. 
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Individuals have their own distinctive patterns of evaluation of their cognitive features. 
These patterns will depend on the characteristics of their actual cognitive capacities and talents 
but also on the functions served by their evaluations of them. It is my contention that those 
individuals whom we classify as humble have attitudes toward their cognitive agencies and 
their components that serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. This is ultimately an 
empirical claim which will need to be tested. There are, however, known considerations that 
point in its favour. In what follow I first clarify the view before discussing these considerations. 
The person who is humble has attitudes toward her cognitive make-up that are 
summary evaluations based on past experiences and assessments. These attitudes, I claim, 
serve both knowledge and value-expressive functions. I shall take each of these two functions 
in turn. Consider first the knowledge function. One can compare it with the utilitarian function. 
Suppose that one has a negative evaluation of pain, and that this attitude serves a utilitarian 
function. The attitude is formed on the basis of past experiences which showed pain to be 
correlated with a lack of preference satisfaction. As a result, one has a negative affective 
reaction to pain which causes one to avoid it. 
“uppose iŶstead, that oŶe has a positiǀe attitude toǁaƌd oŶe͛s problem solving ability 
and that this attitude is formed on the basis of past experiences, beliefs, emotions and 
assessment of oŶe͛s behaviour. This attitude serves a need for knowledge. One has developed 
this evaluative stance over a period time. Because of its knowledge function, it results in a 
preference for those aspeĐts of oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ ǁhiĐh seem to one to have proved 
useful for the purpose of acquiring knowledge or understanding. In short, this person prefers or 
likes those aspects of her cognitive agency that, from her point of view, have promoted the 
acquisition and preservation of epistemic goods. And she treats these aspects (but not others) 
as her cognitive strengths. For the same reasons, this person dislikes, and treats as weaknesses, 
those components of her cognitive agency that, given her beliefs, experiences and emotions, 
appear to have inhibited her access to knowledge or understanding. 
A contrast with another individual may be of assistance to clarify further the point I wish 
to make. Imagine a person who has a positive attitude toward his problem-solving ability. This 
evaluation is based on his beliefs, affective attitudes and past experience. However, this 
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peƌsoŶ͛s past eǀaluatioŶs of his cognitive agency served the need to defend the self from 
potential threats. As a result, he develops a positive stance toward those among his cognitive 
features which have proven effective at sustaining a positive self-concept or image against 
threats. In short, this person likes those aspects of his cognitive make-up that make him feel 
good about himself, although he is not aware that this is the case.34 Suppose that his problem-
solving skills are among these. It is possible that he is good at problem-solving, and having 
solved several problems and felt good about it, he likes this ability of his because of how it 
makes him feel about himself. Of course, he would not like his ability so much if he appreciated 
the structure of his motivations. If he became aware that he likes his ability because of its 
effects on his self-esteem rather than its epistemic qualities, his preference would no longer be 
effective at promoting a high opinion of oneself. 
It is also entirely possible that a person with poor or average problem-solving skills may 
develop a positive attitude or evaluation toward them which serves an ego-defensive function. 
Suppose that this person belongs to a group who is stereotypically thought to have excellent 
problem-solving skills. Although this person may have limited capacities with regard to solving 
problems, because of assumptions about people like him, others may presume that he is skilful 
(or attribute to him more ability than he should be credited with). As a result, he may be 
praised for the problems he solves (thus confirming that he is able) and excused for those he 
does not (which therefore are not taken as evidence that he lacks ability). In these conditions a 
child may develop a positive stance toward his problem-solving ability formed to serve a 
knowledge function. However, since presumably eǀideŶĐe of oŶe͛s tƌue leǀel of aďilitǇ, 
iŶdepeŶdeŶt of otheƌ people͛s opiŶioŶ, ǁould ŵouŶt up as oŶe taĐkles pƌoďleŵs ǁith ŵiǆed 
success and one witnesses the achievements of others, only a person motivated to discount 
such evidence ǁould ďe aďle to pƌeseƌǀe a positiǀe staŶĐe toǁaƌd oŶe͛s pƌoďleŵ-solving ability 
                                                     
34 Were he to become aware of the function served by his evaluations he would be pulled toward changing them 
due to the effect of cognitive dissonance. See Petty and Wegener (1997) on the role of cognitive dissonance on 
attitude change. 
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under these circumstances.35 In such a case the attitude would have acquired a different 
function. Ego-defensiveness would seem to be the most likely candidate. 
Let me hasten to add, before discussing the value-expressive function of attitudes, that 
these examples do not show that reliability aďout oŶe͛s cognitive strengths or weaknesses is 
either necessary or sufficient for humility.36 The view presented here entails that in ordinary 
circumstances the humble person is extremely unlikely be consistently and grossly mistaken 
about her epistemic qualities. However, what is essential to humility is that attitudes are 
formed to serve the need for knowledge. It is possible for an attitude to have this function even 
though it overestimates or underestimates the extent to which the feature it evaluates 
promotes epistemic goods. Overestimation is possible when, for example, current evidence is 
misleading. OŶe ŵaǇ ďelieǀe ǁithout aƌƌogaŶĐe that oŶe͛s disĐoǀeƌǇ is ŵoƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt thaŶ 
hindsight reveals it to be. Underestimation may occur in biased environments for instance. 
MistakeŶ judgeŵeŶts ďǇ oŶe͛s paƌeŶts oƌ teaĐheƌs may cause one to underestimate oŶe͛s 
ability to do mathematics. Whilst suĐh ǀieǁs aƌe likelǇ to affeĐt oŶe͛s self-attitudes profoundly 
ďǇ eatiŶg aǁaǇ at oŶe͛s self-confidence, it is at least possible that one may simply acquire from 
theŵ a ŵistakeŶ assessŵeŶt of oŶe͛s ŵatheŵatiĐal aďilitǇ ǁhiĐh iŶfoƌŵs oŶe͛s attitude, 
seƌǀiŶg a kŶoǁledge fuŶĐtioŶ, of this aspeĐt of oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ŵake-up. Therefore, the 
reliability of oŶe͛s attitude toǁaƌd oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ĐapaĐities is not a necessary condition of 
humility. In addition, it is not sufficient, because as I now show, humility reƋuiƌes that oŶe͛s 
attitudes toǁaƌd oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ ageŶĐǇ also serve a value-expressive function. 
PƌefeƌeŶĐes foƌ soŵe aspeĐts of oŶe͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ŵake-up serve the function of 
eǆpƌessiŶg oŶe͛s ǀalues ǁheŶ theǇ siŶgle out features which are consistent with, and indicative 
of, oŶe͛s ǀalues. More specifically, these are preferences for objects that are generated by the 
need to eǆpƌess oƌ ŵaŶifest oŶe͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to ǁhat oŶe ǀalues. Hence, one may strongly 
                                                     
35 Discounting can be achieved by explaining failure away as bad luck. If the person has power he can delegate the 
difficult problems, believe the praise other may heap on him, and in general exaggerate his contribution to any 
team successes. 
36 Attitudes are not truth-apt since they are likes or dislikes. Therefore, they cannot be, strictly speaking, reliable or 
uŶƌeliaďle. Hoǁeǀeƌ, oŶe͛s attitude toǁaƌd oŶe͛s oǁŶ ĐogŶitiǀe ŵake-up may be more or less consonant with its 
aĐtual stƌeŶgths aŶd ǁeakŶesses. “o oŶe͛s attitudes aƌe ƌeliaďle iŶ this loose seŶse if oŶe pƌefeƌs oŶe͛s aĐtual 
strengths and prefers them to a degree that is proportional to their stƌeŶgth, aŶd oŶe dislikes oŶe͛s aĐtual 
weaknesses in a similarly proportional manner. 
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like oŶe͛s iŵagiŶatioŶ ďeĐause ďǇ usiŶg oŶe͛s imagination one can carry out activities that 
manifest oŶe͛s deeplǇ held ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to the values of freedom and rejection of authority 
figures. For example, one may have found in the past that usiŶg oŶe͛s iŵagination one has 
made decisions that led one to travel and experience freedom and independence away from 
the authoƌitǇ of oŶe͛s paƌeŶts. IŶ this ŵaŶŶeƌ oŶe ŵaǇ deǀelop a pƌefeƌeŶĐe foƌ iŵagiŶatioŶ 
ďeĐause of its aďilitǇ to fulfil oŶe͛s Ŷeed to eǆpƌess the ǀalues to which one is committed. In 
suĐh a Đase, oŶe͛s positiǀe attitude is a ǀalue-expressive one. In the person who is humble 
attitudes that serve a knowledge function are also value-expressive. That is to say, the attitudes 
that express her values are those attitudes that exhibit a preference for epistemic goods such 
as truth, knowledge or understanding. These preferences are adopted as an expression of value 
and thus reflect some deeply held commitment of the person in question.37 In summary, the 
attitudes of the person who is intellectually humble are formed to express a commitment to 
epistemic goods and are formed as a result of past experiences driven by the need for 
knowledge and understanding. 
Humility itself does not consist exclusively of the attitudes themselves but it also 
includes their contents or bases. The content of an attitude, as social psychologists use the 
notion, is not what an attitude represents. Attitudes are associative states; they are not 
representations with accuracy conditions. IŶstead, ͚ĐoŶteŶt͛ oƌ ͚ďase͛ refers to the states which 
convey the information from which the attitude is derived.38 Contents are usually presumed to 
include three kinds of components: beliefs, emotions and past behaviours (Zanna and Rempel, 
1988; Maio and Haddock 2004, pp. 428-9). These states guide the formation of the attitude, 
and determine in part whether it is preserved or revised (Maio and Haddock, 2009).39 Thus, on 
the classic model of attitude, an attitude is caused by its content which it is said to express. The 
attitude itself is an evaluative summary of everything which is comprised in its content. 
Clearly, humility cannot be a mere pattern of likes and dislikes diƌeĐted at oŶe͛s 
cognitive make-up. Hence, if the identification advanced here has to have any plausibility, 
                                                     
37 For the view that value-expressive attitudes are indicative of deep features of the self, see Maio & Olson (2000). 
38 I shall set aside here questions about the cognitive processing that has the base as its input and the attitude as 
output. In my view these processes are not exclusively associative but can be content-driven. 
39 I say in part because external inputs are also decisive. 
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humility must consist of the characteristic emotions, past actions, and beliefs which are the 
psychological bases of the attitudes themselves. This conclusion is not ad hoc, given that it is 
common practice in social psychology to examine attitudes together with their bases since they 
are both causally effective in the production of behaviour. 
I now turn to a defence of the view. In this section I show that the account explains the 
features attributed to modesty, self-acceptance and humility in the preceding sections. In the 
next section I broaden my scope to argue that thinking of (at least) some virtues as clusters of 
strong attitudes explains some of their features such as their motivational structure, their 
unreflectiveness, their cross-situational stability and their ability to direct attention. 
I argued in section 2 that modesty is compatible with underestimation or even 
overestimation of oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ suĐĐesses. The account of humility in terms of attitudes 
easily explains this fact by pointing to the existence of factors such as lack of information or 
biased environments in which evaluations formed to serve the need for knowledge are not 
reliable. There I also argued that what is crucial to modesty is that one cares for, or feels 
positive about, oŶe͛s episteŵiĐ suĐĐesses ďeĐause theǇ pƌoŵote episteŵiĐ goods. The ŶotioŶ of 
attitude function captures well what is at work here, without postulating the existence of 
conscious motivations to value epistemic goods non-instrumentally. 
I have argued in section 3 that self-aĐĐeptaŶĐe is a ǁaǇ of aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg oŶe͛s 
limitations which is incompatible with resignation and which requires full disclosure to others 
eǀeŶ ǁheŶ doiŶg so is Ŷot iŶ oŶe͛s self-interest. The position developed in this paper identifies 
self-acceptance as a cluster of negative attitudes, serving knowledge and value-expressive 
functions, directed toward some aspects of one͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ. These negative evaluations 
are incompatible with a stance of resignation. Since these attitudes serve the need for 
knowledge, they cause one to avoid behaviour and objects that inhibit the satisfaction of this 
need. Avoidance is the opposite of the kiŶd of dǁelliŶg oŶ oŶe͛s oǁŶ failuƌes ǁhiĐh is 
characteristic of the person who is resigned. Most probably, the person, who dislikes some of 
her traits because they prevent knowledge acquisition and preservation, develops alternative 
strategies to satisfy her need for knowledge.  
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The saŵe Ŷegatiǀe attitudes aƌe also iŶĐoŵpatiďle ǁith a dispositioŶ to hide oŶe͛s 
limitations (uŶless ƌeǀealiŶg theŵ pƌoǀes to ďe iŶ oŶe͛s self-interest). Since these evaluations 
have a value-expressive function, the values which are opposed by the objects of these 
attitudes must be epistemic values, given that these attitudes also serve the knowledge 
function. Hence, one dislikes these features of oneself because they hinder oŶe͛s eǆpƌessioŶ of 
the values of knowledge and understanding. Since these attitudes serve the needs to pursue 
and value truth and knowledge they offer no incentive to the person who has them to hide 
their existence from others. Further, it would seem that a plausible way of valuing truth and 
knowledge is to value their acquisition by, and transmission to, others. Hence, the possession of 
these attitudes actually provides aŶ iŶĐeŶtiǀe to ƌeǀeal oŶe͛s liŵitatioŶs to otheƌs siŶĐe suĐh 
openness facilitates directly and indirectly their ability to acquire knowledge.40 
The account, in addition, can easily explain why one may be humble about some aspect 
of oneself but not others. The person, who is humble about one of his cognitive features but 
not others, has attitudes toward those features which serve knowledge and value-expressive 
functions whilst his attitudes toward those other features fulfil different functions. Relatedly, 
the view that humility is a cluster of attitudes explains why individuals can be said to be modest 
about the successes of others (children, or apprentices) whose cognitive agency has been 
shaped under their influence. In these cases, a peƌsoŶ͛s attitude toward the cognitive features 
possessed by these individuals serves knowledge and value-expressive functions rather than 
the need for a positive self-image. 
Finally, the account explains why humility has two distinct dimensions: modesty about 
success and acceptance about limitations, whose relationship it illuminates. A person may 
acquire negative attitudes toward some of her cognitive features as a result of past attempts to 
satisfy the need for knowledge and the expression of value. To this extent, this person is 
accepting of her limitations. She may however have also acquired some positive attitudes 
toward other aspects of herself such as her memory as a result of past experiences driven by 
the need to protect her self-image. Such an individual will be immodest about some aspects of 
                                                     
40 It does not follow that a self-accepting individual must reveal his limitations to those who, he suspects, mean ill 
toward him. It also does not follow that he must reveal his limitations unprompted to strangers when such a 
revelation is unasked for. 
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the self, whilst accepting of some of her limitations. Similarly, the person whom I labelled as 
͚faŶatiĐ͛ iŶ seĐtioŶ ϰ aďoǀe ŵaǇ haǀe positiǀe attitudes toǁaƌd aspects of her cognitive agency 
that are compatible with modesty, but possess negative attitudes toward other aspects of her 
cognitive make-up which are formed to satisfy the need to fit in with her in-group and thus 
share its prejudices. Individuals with these psychologies are likely from time to time to be 
internally conflicted. But as I argued above they exist. Their existence shows that humility has 
two dimensions. The view defended here is to my knowledge the only one to explain both their 
close connections and their separateness. 
 
 
6. Can virtues be clusters of attitudes? 
 
Readers may still be sceptical about the suitability of attitudes as the construct that gives 
psychological reality to virtue. In this section I present a number of considerations that support 
the identification of at least some virtues with clusters of strong attitudes. None of these are 
individually conclusive, but together they build up a case that has sufficient plausibility to 
warrant further empirical investigation. I also consider two objections to the account before 
indicating how it opens up new avenues for research on the relations of virtues to vices. 
There is no agreement on the nature of virtue. However, they are at the very least 
psychological features of agents which make them better persons (Battaly, 2015). Intellectual 
virtues are the excellences of epistemic agents. In addition, virtues are plausibly said to have 
the following features:41 they direct behaviour and visual attention; they reliably tend to bring 
about good effects; they are stable across situations; they have characteristic motives but can 
be fairly unreflective; they are linked to characteristic emotional responses. Attitudes have 
been empirically shown to possess all of these features. For this reason, the identification (or at 
least close connection) of virtues with attitudes is empirically well-supported.42 
                                                     
41 There is considerable disagreement on each one of them. 
42 I am not the first to make this claim. See Webber (2015) for an account of some ethical virtues in terms of 
attitudes. Unlike Webber I hold that the notion of attitude function is crucial if we want to understand why virtues 
are attitudes. 
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There is robust empirical evidence that attitudes, when they are strong, are predictive 
of behaviour. The strength of an attitude is the strength of the association between the object 
of the attitude and the positive or negative valence (Fazio, 2000). 43 It is thus not a measure of 
how strongly one feels about the object. In addition, strong attitudes have been shown to 
direct attention and to be stable across situational contexts (Fazio, 2000). The contents of 
attitudes always include affective components while the attitudes themselves are an example 
of valenced cognition (Maio and Haddock, 2009). In addition, the arguments developed in 
section 5 have shown that virtue can be fairly unreflective since the psychological states that 
motivate behaviour may respond to a need for knowledge without the subject being fully 
aware of his motivational structure. Finally, in the preceding section I have also indicated that, 
at least with regard to humility, unless the environment in ǁhiĐh oŶe has foƌŵed oŶe͛s 
attitudes was systematically biased and misleading, the person whose attitudes instantiate 
virtue is likely to be reliable about her epistemic strengths and weakness and to act in ways that 
promote the acquisition of epistemic goods. 
It may be objected to the view that intellectual humility is a cluster of strong attitudes 
that humility is a trait of character, but attitudes are evaluations rather than character traits. 
Further, one may also object that there already are in the literature good candidates for the 
kind of construct that supplies psychological reality to virtues. These are the personality traits 
studied by personality psychology (Ashton and Lee, 2008). I shall take these objections in turn. 
Often philosophers use the notion of a trait of character without defining it. Since virtue is 
commonly used to include cognitive faculties such as memory and perception, it would seem 
that a trait of character in this context is something which is dispositionally stable, that can be 
ŵaŶifested iŶ ŵultiple situatioŶs, that is paƌt of the ageŶt͛s ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ iŶ so faƌ as it is Ŷot 
completely unconscious or automatic, and perhaps also a feature of oneself with which the 
subject identifies. Once character traits are explained in such a capacious manner so that they 
can be plausibly said to include memory as well as perseverance, it is perfectly plausible to 
think that clusters of attitudes when combined with their informational bases and contents, 
and the behaviours which they cause belong within this category. 
                                                     
43 The notion of attitude strength is however used ambiguously in the literature to refer to different measures. 
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Yet, one may continue to object that virtues, and especially humility, are to be identified 
with personality traits rather than attitudes. One dominant account of these traits identifies six 
of them.44 These are: Humility-honesty, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, 
Consciousness, and Openness to experience (HEXACO, in short) (Ashton and Lee, 2008). The 
HEXACO traits have been isolated through lexical studies of the most common psychological 
Ƌualities attƌiďuted to people͛s peƌsoŶalitǇ iŶ seǀeƌal laŶguages. Despite their superficial 
similarity these personality characteristics bear little actual resemblance to the character traits 
invoked by virtue responsibilist epistemologists. Thus, emotionality refers to sentimentality 
ǁhilst ĐoŶsĐieŶtiousŶess is a ŵaƌk of soŵeoŶe͛s peƌfeĐtioŶisŵ. These traits are best 
understood as temperaments rather than virtue-like character traits since they do not exhibit 
some of the essential features of the latter (cf., Alfano, 2012). For instance, personality traits 
are not excellences because they do not make the people who have them better. Perhaps the 
best evidence that personality traits are not virtues but temperaments comes for biology (Lewis 
and Bates, 2014). Recent studies have highlighted the genetic basis of personality traits which 
are thus perhaps best thought as the kind of natural virtue that makes it easier or harder to 
acquire the attitudes required by virtue proper. 
Whilst, as I have argued in this paper, the social psychology of attitudes provides a 
framework that sheds novel light on the nature of intellectual humility in particular and virtue 
in general, it also opens up three avenues of research that hold an enormous amount of 
promise. Firstly, there are well-developed methodologies for measuring attitudes and these 
could be applied to the study of virtue. Secondly, there is a large literature on the kind of 
interventions which are effective to bring about attitude change. These could be explored as a 
means to educate for virtue. Thirdly, the framework of attitudes provides a new and rich way of 
approaching intellectual vices. For instance, arrogance and self-abasement are among the vices 
that oppose intellectual humility along its modesty dimension. The person who is arrogant is 
immodest, whilst the self-abasing individual is someone who belittles his own intellectual 
abilities. The vocabulary of attitudes helps to understand these vices and to avoid the error of 
thinking of humility as a mean between them. The humble person is not the person who is 
                                                     
44 Earlier accounts identified five known as the big fives to which a sixth (humility) was added more recently. 
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sufficiently arrogant not to be self-abasing, and sufficiently self-abasing not to be arrogant. 
Given the accouŶt offeƌed aďoǀe, aƌƌogaŶĐe is also a Đlusteƌ of stƌoŶg attitudes toǁaƌd oŶe͛s 
own cognitive agency and its components. These attitudes however serve an ego-defensive 
function so that the arrogant individual prefers those aspects of her cognitive make-up that 
help her to sustain her self-esteem. Similarly, self-abasement is also a cluster of attitudes 
toǁaƌd oŶe͛s oǁŶ ĐogŶitiǀe ageŶĐǇ; ďut these attitudes seƌǀe a soĐial-adjustive function 
because the person who belittles her own abilities has made her own the dim view of her 
capacities that she thinks others hold. I plan to develop these themes in subsequent papers.45 
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